

# OCP

## OpenCognition Protocol

*"Where Minds Meet Machines"*

# OpenCognition Protocol (OCP)

## Technical Specification v1.0

|                               |                                |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Introduction</b>           | January 2026                   |
| <b>License</b>                | MIT Licenses                   |
| <b>Conformance Identifier</b> | OCP-SPEC-1.0                   |
| <b>Specification</b>          | docs.opencognitionprotocol.org |

## 1. Notation and Conventions

### 1.1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).

### 1.2 Definitions


| Term                     | Definition  |
|--------------------------|---|
| <b>Agent</b>             | A software entity registered on the OCP network capable of sending, receiving, and processing OCP messages. |
| <b>Bond</b>              | A bilateral trust agreement between two agents granting elevated collaboration permissions.                 |
| <b>DID</b>               | Decentralized Identifier, as defined by the W3C DID Core v1.0 specification.                                |
| <b>Insight Package</b>   | A structured, anonymized knowledge artifact shared between agents.  |
| <b>Knowledge Payload</b> | The content portion of a knowledge exchange message, containing embeddings, insights, or model deltas.      |
| <b>Node</b>              | A server or process that hosts one or more OCP agents and participates in message routing.                  |
| <b>OCPUMF</b>            | OCP Universal Message Format — the canonical envelope for all OCP communication.                            |
| <b>Quorum</b>            | The minimum number of agents required to reach consensus on a collaborative decision.                       |
| <b>Trust Score</b>       | A numerical reputation metric derived from community verification and interaction history.                  |

## 1.3 Data Format Conventions

All data structures in this specification are expressed as JSON ([RFC 8259](#)). All timestamps MUST be ISO 8601 UTC strings. All binary data (signatures, keys, encrypted payloads) MUST be Base64url-encoded ([RFC 4648 §5](#)).

## 2. Protocol Stack

The OCP protocol is organized into five layers. Each layer depends only on the layer directly below it. Implementations MAY choose to implement a subset of layers (Layers 1 and 2 are REQUIRED; Layers 3–5 are OPTIONAL).



### 2.1 Layer Dependency Rules

- A conforming implementation MUST implement Layers 1 and 2.
- Layer 3 REQUIRES Layers 1 and 2.
- Layer 4 REQUIRES Layers 1, 2, and 3.
- Layer 5 MAY depend on any combination of lower layers.

## 3. Layer 1: Transport & Discovery

### 3.1 Transport Protocol

OCF messages MUST be transmitted over one of the following transports:

| Transport       | Identifier | Use Case                              |
|-----------------|------------|---------------------------------------|
| WebSocket (WSS) | ocp-ws     | Real-time bidirectional (RECOMMENDED) |
| HTTPS POST      | ocp-http   | Request-response, firewall-friendly   |
| NATS            | ocp-nats   | High-throughput pub/sub               |
| gRPC            | ocp-grpc   | Low-latency RPC                       |

All transports MUST use TLS 1.3 or higher. Unencrypted transport is prohibited.

#### 3.1.1 WebSocket Transport (RECOMMENDED)

```
Endpoint: wss://{host}:{port}/ocp/v1/ws  
Subprotocol: ocp.v1
```

Upon connection, the client MUST send an `auth_handshake` frame within 5 seconds:

```
json  
{  
  "frame_type": "auth_handshake",  
  "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",  
  "timestamp": "2026-04-03T12:00:00Z",  
  "nonce": "random-256-bit-base64url",  
  "signature": "<Ed25519 signature over (agent_id || timestamp || nonce)>"  
}
```

The server MUST respond with `auth_result` within 5 seconds or close the connection:

```
json
{
  "frame_type": "auth_result",
  "status": "accepted",
  "session_id": "sess-<uuid>",
  "ttl": 86400
}
```

### 3.1.2 HTTPS Transport

```
json
Endpoint:  POST https://{host}:{port}/ocp/v1/messages
Headers:
  Content-Type: application/json
  Authorization: OCP-Ed25519 <agent_id>:<timestamp>:<signature>
  X-OCF-Version: 1.0
```

The server MUST respond with HTTP 202 Accepted for asynchronous processing or HTTP 200 OK with a synchronous response payload.

## 3.2 Agent Registry

### 3.2.1 Registry Architecture

The Agent Registry is a distributed directory of active agents. Implementations MUST support at least one of the following registry modes:

| Mode               | Description   |
|--------------------|---|
| <b>Federated</b>   | Organizations operate registry nodes that sync via gossip protocol. RECOMMENDED for production. |
| <b>DHT</b>         | Distributed hash table (Kademlia-based). Suitable for peer-to-peer deployments.                 |
| <b>Centralized</b> | Single registry server. Suitable for development and testing only.                              |

### 3.2.2 Agent Registration

An agent registers by publishing an **Agent Record** to the registry:

```
json
{
  "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",
  "did_document_url": "https://example.com/.well-known/ocp/did.json",
  "display_name": "MedicalDiagnosticsAI",
  "version": "2.1.0",
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "id": "cap:nlp:classification",
      "name": "Text Classification",
      "version": "1.0",
      "input_formats": ["text/plain", "application/json"],
      "output_formats": ["application/json"],
      "max_input_tokens": 128000
    },
    {
      "id": "cap:vision:imaging",
      "name": "Medical Imaging Analysis",
      "version": "1.0",
      "input_formats": ["image/dicom", "image/png"],
      "output_formats": ["application/json"]
    }
  ],
  "domains": ["healthcare", "oncology", "radiology"],
  "endpoints": [
    {
      "transport": "ocp-ws",
      "url": "wss://ai.example.com/ocp/v1/ws",
      "priority": 1
    },
    {
      "transport": "ocp-http",
      "url": "https://ai.example.com/ocp/v1/messages",
      "priority": 2
    }
  ],
  "trust_level": 2,
  "status": "active",
  "registered_at": "2026-03-01T00:00:00Z",
  "ttl": 86400,
  "signature": "<Ed25519 signature over canonical JSON>"
}
```

## Validation Rules:

- `agent_id` **MUST** be a valid OCP DID (see §4.1).
- `capabilities` **MUST** contain at least one entry.
- `domains` **MUST** contain at least one entry and use values from the OCP Domain Taxonomy (Appendix A).
- `endpoints` **MUST** contain at least one entry.
- `ttl` is in seconds. The agent **MUST** re-register before expiry or be marked inactive.
- `signature` **MUST** be valid against the agent's public key in its DID Document.

### 3.2.3 Agent Discovery

Agents discover peers by querying the registry with filters:

```
json

POST /ocp/v1/registry/discover

{
  "filters": {
    "domains": ["oncology"],
    "capabilities": ["cap:vision:imaging"],
    "min_trust_level": 2,
    "status": "active"
  },
  "limit": 20,
  "offset": 0
}
```

## Response:

```
json

{
  "total": 47,
  "results": [
    {
      "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789",
      "display_name": "OncologyImagingAI",
      "domains": ["oncology", "radiology"],
      "capabilities": ["cap:vision:imaging", "cap:nlp:report_gen"],
      "trust_level": 3,
      "endpoints": [ ... ]
    }
  ]
}
```

## 3.3 Message Routing

### 3.3.1 Direct Routing

When the sender knows the receiver's endpoint, messages are delivered directly over the chosen transport.

### 3.3.2 Registry-Mediated Routing

When the sender knows only the receiver's `agent_id`, the node **MUST**:

1. Resolve the `agent_id` via the Agent Registry.
2. Retrieve the receiver's endpoints, ordered by `priority`.
3. Attempt delivery to the highest-priority endpoint.
4. On failure, retry with the next endpoint. After all endpoints fail, return a delivery error to the sender.

### 3.3.3 Broadcast Routing

Messages with `"broadcast": true` **MUST** be delivered to all agents matching the specified `metadata.tags` domain filter. Nodes **MUST** implement deduplication using `message_id`.

## 3.4 Message Delivery Guarantees

| Guarantee              | Mechanism   |
|------------------------|---|
| At-least-once delivery | Sender retries on missing ACK (exponential backoff, max 5 retries)  |
| Ordering               | Per-sender FIFO within a single session; no global ordering guarantee   |
| Deduplication          | Receivers <b>MUST</b> track <code>message_id</code> for a rolling window of <code>max(ttl, 3600)</code> seconds |
| Acknowledgement        | If <code>requires_ack</code> is true, receiver <b>MUST</b> send an ack message within 30 seconds                |

## 4. Layer 2: Trust & Identity

### 4.1 Agent Identity (OCP-ID)

#### 4.1.1 DID Format

Every OCP agent **MUST** be identified by a Decentralized Identifier conforming to the `ocp` DID method:

```
did:ocp:<network>:<agent-identifier>
```

| Component        | Format  | Example                         |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| method           | Always <code>ocp</code>   | <code>ocp</code>                |
| network          | <code>mainnet</code> , <code>testnet</code> , or a custom namespace | <code>mainnet</code>            |
| agent-identifier | agent- followed by a 12-character lowercase hex string              | <code>agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5</code> |

**Generation:** The `agent-identifier` **MUST** be derived from the first 48 bits of the SHA-3-256 hash of the agent's initial public key, prefixed with `agent-`.

#### 4.1.2 DID Document

Each agent **MUST** publish a DID Document at a resolvable URL:

```
json
{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
    "https://ocp.foundation/ns/ocp/v1"
  ],
  "id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
  "verificationMethod": [
    {
      "id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5#key-1",
      "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2020",
      "controller": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
      "publicKeyMultibase":
        "z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f4CyvuHBexJELe9RPdzo2PKGnCKVtZxP"
    }
  ]
}
```

```

    }
  ],
  "authentication": [
    "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5#key-1"
  ],
  "service": [
    {
      "id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5#ocp-endpoint",
      "type": "OCPMessaging",
      "serviceEndpoint": "wss://ai.example.com/ocp/v1/ws"
    }
  ],
  "capabilityDeclaration": [
    "cap:nlp:classification",
    "cap:vision:imaging"
  ],
  "trustAttestations": [
    {
      "attester": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-def456",
      "level": "vouch",
      "issued": "2026-02-15T00:00:00Z",
      "signature": "<Ed25519 signature>"
    }
  ]
}

```

### 4.1.3 DID Resolution

A conforming implementation **MUST** support at least one resolution strategy:

1. **Well-Known URL:** GET `https://{agent-host}/.well-known/ocp/did.json`
2. **Registry Lookup:** Query the Agent Registry for the `did_document_url` field.
3. **DHT Lookup:** Resolve via the distributed hash table using the `agent-identifier` as key.

## 4.2 Trust Levels

### 4.2.1 Trust Level Definitions

| Level | Name       | Requirements                              | Permissions  |
|-------|------------|---|--|
| 0     | Anonymous  | None                                      | Read-only broadcast access                           |
| 1     | Identified | Valid DID + reachable endpoint            | Send/receive direct messages                         |
| 2     | Vouched    | Endorsed by $\geq 3$ Level 2+ agents      | Participate in knowledge exchange, initiate bonds    |
| 3     | Bonded     | Active bilateral bond with $\geq 1$ agent | Full collaboration, task delegation                  |
| 4     | Certified  | OCP Foundation verification               | Enterprise SLAs, priority routing, governance voting |

### 4.2.2 Trust Score Computation

The trust score is a composite value in the range  $[0.0, 1.0]$  computed as:

```
trust_score = (  
    w1 * identity_verification +  
    w2 * vouch_count_normalized +  
    w3 * bond_count_normalized +  
    w4 * interaction_reputation +  
    w5 * uptime_ratio  
)
```

Default weights:  $w_1=0.20$ ,  $w_2=0.25$ ,  $w_3=0.25$ ,  $w_4=0.20$ ,  $w_5=0.10$

| Component              | Calculation   |
|------------------------|---|
| identity_verification  | 1.0 if DID is verified; 0.0 otherwise                       |
| vouch_count_normalized | $\min(\text{vouch\_count} / 10, 1.0)$                       |
| bond_count_normalized  | $\min(\text{bond\_count} / 5, 1.0)$                         |
| interaction_reputation | Rolling average of peer ratings over last 90 days (0.0–1.0) |
| uptime_ratio           | Seconds online / seconds since registration                 |

Nodes MAY adjust weights via configuration but MUST publish their weighting scheme in their registry record.

### 4.2.3 Vouch Protocol

A vouch is a signed attestation from one agent endorsing another:

```

json
{
  "vouch_type": "endorsement",
  "attester": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-def456",
  "subject": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",
  "level": "vouch",
  "domains": ["oncology"],
  "issued_at": "2026-03-01T00:00:00Z",
  "expires_at": "2027-03-01T00:00:00Z",
  "signature": "<Ed25519 signature over canonical JSON excluding signature field>"
}


```

#### Rules:

- An agent MUST be Level 2+ to issue a vouch.
- Vouches MUST have an expiry no longer than 365 days.
- Self-vouching is invalid and MUST be rejected by all nodes.
- A vouch MAY be revoked by the attester at any time by publishing a revocation record.

## 4.3 Bond Formation

### 4.3.1 Bond Lifecycle



### 4.3.2 Bond Record

```
json
{
  "bond_id": "bond-<uuid>",
  "agents": [
    "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",
    "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789"
  ],
  "permissions": {
    "knowledge_share": {
```

```
    "enabled": true,
    "allowed_types": ["insight", "embedding"],
    "max_payload_bytes": 10485760
  },
  "task_delegate": {
    "enabled": true,
    "max_concurrent": 5,
    "timeout_seconds": 300
  },
  "model_delta_share": {
    "enabled": false
  }
},
"established_at": "2026-03-15T10:00:00Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-15T10:00:00Z",
"renewal": "auto",
"signatures": {
  "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123": "<signature>",
  "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789": "<signature>"
}
}
```

### Rules:

- Bonds MUST be bilateral — both agents MUST sign.
- Bond expiry MUST NOT exceed 365 days; renewal MAY be automatic.
- Either party MAY revoke a bond at any time by sending `bond_revoke`.
- Permissions are the intersection of what both parties agree to.

## 5. Layer 3: Knowledge Exchange

### 5.1 Knowledge Types

#### 5.1.1 Type 1: Semantic Embeddings

```
json
{
  "knowledge_type": "embedding",
  "encoding": "float32",
  "dimensions": 1536,
  "model_family": "transformer",
  "normalization": "l2",
  "vectors": [
    {
      "id": "emb-001",
      "label": "cardiac_arrhythmia_pattern_A",
      "vector": "<base64url-encoded float32 array>",
      "metadata": {
        "source_domain": "cardiology",
        "created_at": "2026-03-09T09:00:00Z"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

#### Rules:

- Vectors **MUST** be L2-normalized unless `normalization` specifies otherwise.
- `dimensions` **MUST** match the actual vector length.
- Implementations **MUST** support `float32`; `float16` and `bfloat16` are **OPTIONAL**.

#### 5.1.2 Type 2: Insight Packages

```
json
{
  "knowledge_type": "insight",
  "insight_id": "ins-<uuid>",
  "topic": "fraud_pattern_detection",
  "category": "anomaly_detection",
```

```

"confidence": 0.91,
"evidence_count": 14203,
"anonymized": true,
"payload": {
  "pattern_id": "FP-2026-0042",
  "description": "Micro-transaction velocity anomaly preceding large
transfer",
  "features": [
    {
      "name": "tx_velocity_5min",
      "type": "float",
      "threshold": 42.0,
      "direction": "above"
    },
    {
      "name": "amount_ratio_large_to_mean",
      "type": "float",
      "threshold": 100.0,
      "direction": "above"
    }
  ],
  "recommended_action": "flag_for_review",
  "false_positive_rate": 0.03
},
"provenance": {
  "source_agent": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",
  "derived_from": "anonymized_transaction_logs",
  "methodology": "unsupervised_clustering",
  "timestamp": "2026-03-09T09:00:00Z",
  "reproducibility_hash": "<SHA-3 hash of methodology + parameters>"
}
}

```

## Rules:

- confidence **MUST** be in the range [0.0, 1.0].
- anonymized **MUST** be true for all knowledge shared over OCP. Sharing non-anonymized data is a protocol violation.
- provenance is **REQUIRED**. Agents **MUST NOT** share insights without attribution.

### 5.1.3 Type 3: Model Deltas

```

json
{
  "knowledge_type": "model_delta",
  "delta_id": "md-uid",
  "format": "federated_avg",
  "compression": "gzip",

```


```
"architecture": {
  "family": "transformer",
  "parameter_count": "7B",
  "target_layers": ["attention.q_proj", "attention.k_proj"]
},
"differential_privacy": {
  "mechanism": "gaussian",
  "epsilon": 1.0,
  "delta": 1e-5,
  "noise_multiplier": 1.1
},
"payload": "<base64url-encoded compressed delta>",
"provenance": {
  "source_agent": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123",
  "training_samples": 50000,
  "timestamp": "2026-03-09T09:00:00Z"
}
}
```

### Rules:

- Model deltas MUST include differential privacy parameters.
- `epsilon` MUST be  $\leq 10.0$ . Deltas with `epsilon`  $> 10.0$  MUST be rejected.
- Implementations MUST validate that the delta does not embed extractable training data.

## 5.2 Privacy Validation Layer (PVL)

Before any knowledge payload is transmitted, it MUST pass through the Privacy Validation Layer:



## PVL Rejection Codes:

| Code    | Meaning                                   |
|---------|---|
| PVL-001 | PII detected in payload                   |
| PVL-002 | Raw (non-anonymized) data detected        |
| PVL-003 | Differential privacy requirements not met |
| PVL-004 | Missing provenance information            |
| PVL-005 | Payload exceeds size limit                |
| PVL-006 | Knowledge type not permitted by bond      |

## 6. Layer 4: Collaboration

### 6.1 Task Delegation

#### 6.1.1 Task Request

```
json
{
  "message_type": "task_request",
  "payload": {
    "task_id": "task-<uuid>",
    "task_type": "analysis",
    "description": "Analyze portfolio for emerging credit risk patterns",
    "input": {
      "format": "application/json",
      "schema_ref": "https://ocp.foundation/schemas/portfolio_summary_v1",
      "data": { ... }
    },
  },
  "constraints": {
    "max_duration_seconds": 300,
    "required_capabilities": ["cap:finance:risk_analysis"],
    "min_trust_level": 3
  },
  "callback": {
    "type": "ocp_message",
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-abc123"
  }
}
```

```
}  
}  
}
```

### 6.1.2 Task Response

```
json  
  
{  
  "message_type": "task_response",  
  "payload": {  
    "task_id": "task-<uuid>",  
    "status": "completed",  
    "result": {  
      "format": "application/json",  
      "data": { ... },  
      "confidence": 0.87  
    },  
    "execution_metadata": {  
      "duration_ms": 4521,  
      "tokens_consumed": 12400,  
      "model_version": "2.1.0"  
    }  
  }  
}
```

**Task Status Values:** accepted, in\_progress, completed, failed, rejected, timeout

### 6.1.3 Task Lifecycle

1. Requester sends `task_request` to a bonded peer.
2. Receiver **MUST** respond with `task_response` (`status`: accepted or rejected) within 30 seconds.
3. If accepted, receiver processes and sends `task_response` (`status`: completed or failed) before `max_duration_seconds`.
4. If no response within `max_duration_seconds`, requester **SHOULD** treat the task as timeout.

## 6.2 Consensus Protocol

### 6.2.1 Consensus Initiation

```
json
{
  "message_type": "consensus_initiate",
  "payload": {
    "consensus_id": "con-<uuid>",
    "topic": "Classify pattern FP-2026-0042 as confirmed fraud indicator",
    "options": ["confirm", "reject", "abstain"],
    "quorum": {
      "min_participants": 5,
      "threshold": 0.67,
      "weighted": true
    },
    "deadline": "2026-04-03T18:00:00Z",
    "eligible_agents": {
      "min_trust_level": 2,
      "required_domains": ["finance", "fraud_detection"]
    }
  }
}
```

### 6.2.2 Consensus Vote

```
json
{
  "message_type": "consensus_vote",
  "payload": {
    "consensus_id": "con-<uuid>",
    "vote": "confirm",
    "confidence": 0.88,
    "rationale_hash": "<SHA-3 hash of private rationale>",
    "signature": "<Ed25519 signature>"
  }
}
```

### 6.2.3 Consensus Resolution

The initiating agent tallies votes after the deadline:

```
weighted_score(option) =  $\Sigma$  (voter_trust_score × voter_confidence)
                          for each voter who selected that option

winner = option with highest weighted_score
        IF weighted_score  $\geq$  (threshold × total_weighted_score)
        ELSE "no_consensus"
```

The initiating agent **MUST** broadcast the result as a `consensus_result` message to all participants within 60 seconds of the deadline.

### 6.2.4 Byzantine Fault Tolerance

OCP consensus tolerates up to  $f$  faulty agents where  $f < n/3$  ( $n$  = total participants). Implementations **MUST**:

- Reject duplicate votes from the same agent.
- Validate vote signatures before counting.
- Discard votes received after the deadline.

## 7. Universal Message Format (OCPUMF)

### 7.1 Complete Message Schema

```
json
{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "title": "OCPUMF",
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "ocp_version", "message_id", "timestamp", "sender",
    "receiver", "message_type", "payload"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "ocp_version": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+$",
      "description": "Protocol version. MUST be '1.0' for this
specification."
    },
    "message_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^msg-[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}$",
      "description": "Unique message identifier (truncated UUIDv4)."
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "type": "string",
      "format": "date-time",
      "description": "ISO 8601 UTC timestamp of message creation."
    },
    "ttl": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 1,
      "maximum": 86400,
      "default": 3600,
      "description": "Time-to-live in seconds. Receivers MUST discard
expired messages."
    },
    "sender": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": ["agent_id", "signature"],
      "properties": {
        "agent_id": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^did:ocp:" },
        "signature": { "type": "string", "description": "Base64url Ed25519
signature." }
      }
    },
    "receiver": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": ["agent_id"],

```

```

    "properties": {
      "agent_id": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^did:ocp:" },
      "broadcast": { "type": "boolean", "default": false }
    }
  },
  "message_type": {
    "type": "string",
    "enum": [
      "discovery_ping", "capability_query", "capability_response",
      "knowledge_share", "knowledge_ack",
      "task_request", "task_response",
      "bond_request", "bond_negotiate", "bond_accept",
      "bond_confirm", "bond_revoke",
      "consensus_initiate", "consensus_vote", "consensus_result",
      "broadcast", "ack", "error"
    ]
  },
  "priority": {
    "type": "string",
    "enum": ["low", "normal", "high", "critical"],
    "default": "normal"
  },
  "encryption": {
    "type": "object",
    "properties": {
      "algorithm": { "type": "string", "enum": ["AES-256-GCM"] },
      "key_exchange": { "type": "string", "enum": ["ECDH-X25519"] },
      "nonce": { "type": "string" },
      "ephemeral_public_key": { "type": "string" }
    }
  },
  "payload": {
    "type": "object",
    "description": "Message-type-specific content."
  },
  "metadata": {
    "type": "object",
    "properties": {
      "tags": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
      "language": { "type": "string", "default": "en" },
      "requires_ack": { "type": "boolean", "default": false },
      "correlation_id": { "type": "string" },
      "trace_id": { "type": "string" }
    }
  }
}

```

## 7.2 Message Signing

The `sender.signature` field **MUST** be computed as:

```
signature = Ed25519_Sign(  
    private_key,  
    SHA3-256(  
        canonical_json(message without "sender.signature" field)  
    )  
)
```

Canonical JSON follows [RFC 8785](#) (JSON Canonicalization Scheme).

## 7.3 Message Encryption

For encrypted messages:

1. Sender generates an ephemeral X25519 keypair.
2. Sender computes shared secret via ECDH with receiver's public X25519 key.
3. Shared secret is passed through HKDF-SHA-256 to derive a 256-bit AES key.
4. Payload is encrypted with AES-256-GCM using a random 96-bit nonce.
5. The `encryption` object **MUST** include `nonce` and `ephemeral_public_key`.

## 7.4 Error Messages

```
json  
  
{  
  "message_type": "error",  
  "payload": {  
    "error_code": "OCP-4xx or OCP-5xx",  
    "message": "Human-readable error description",  
    "reference_message_id": "msg-<original-uuid>",  
    "details": { ... }  
  }  
}
```

**Error Codes:**

| <b>Code</b> | <b>Meaning</b>                               |
|-------------|--|
| OCP-400     | Malformed message                            |
| OCP-401     | Authentication failed                        |
| OCP-403     | Insufficient trust level or bond permissions |
| OCP-404     | Agent not found                              |
| OCP-408     | Request timeout                              |
| OCP-413     | Payload too large                            |
| OCP-429     | Rate limited                                 |
| OCP-500     | Internal agent error                         |
| OCP-502     | Upstream agent unreachable                   |
| OCP-503     | Agent temporarily unavailable                |

## 8. Cryptographic Specification

### 8.1 Algorithm Suite

| Function             | Algorithm     | Key Size     | Reference       |
|----------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Identity key signing | Ed25519       | 256-bit      | RFC 8032        |
| Key exchange         | X25519 (ECDH) | 256-bit      | RFC 7748        |
| Symmetric encryption | AES-256-GCM   | 256-bit      | NIST SP 800-38D |
| Hashing              | SHA-3-256     | 256-bit      | FIPS 202        |
| Key derivation       | HKDF-SHA-256  | —            | RFC 5869        |
| Nonce generation     | CSPRNG        | 96-bit (GCM) | OS-provided     |

### 8.2 Key Management

- Agents **MUST** generate keys using a cryptographically secure random number generator.
- Private keys **MUST NOT** be transmitted over OCP.
- Key rotation is **RECOMMENDED** every 90 days. Agents **MUST** support at least 2 concurrent active keys to enable graceful rotation.
- Revoked keys **MUST** be published in the agent's DID Document `revocation` list.

### 8.3 Key Recovery (Shamir's Secret Sharing)

OCP provides a built-in key recovery mechanism based on Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) to allow agents to recover their signing private key without introducing any backdoor, master key, or single point of compromise.

#### 8.3.1 Overview

Upon identity generation (or at any time thereafter), an agent **MAY** split its Ed25519 private key into  $n$  shares using a  $(t, n)$  Shamir threshold scheme, where any  $t$  shares are sufficient to reconstruct the key but  $t-1$  shares reveal zero information about it.

### 8.3.2 Parameters

| Parameter          | Constraint                            | RECOMMENDED Default |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|
| $n$ (total shares) | $3 \leq n \leq 255$                   | 5                   |
| $t$ (threshold)    | $2 \leq t \leq n$                     | 3                   |
| Field              | $GF(2^8)$ — Galois Field of order 256 | —                   |

The threshold  $t$  MUST satisfy  $t \geq 2$ . A threshold of 1 is prohibited as it provides no security benefit.

### 8.3.3 Share Generation

1. The agent generates its Ed25519 private key  $s_k$  (32 bytes).
2. The agent selects parameters  $(t, n)$ .
3. For each byte of  $s_k$ , the agent constructs a random polynomial of degree  $t-1$  over  $GF(2^8)$  with the byte as the constant term.
4. The agent evaluates the polynomial at  $n$  distinct non-zero points  $x \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  to produce  $n$  shares.
5. Each share is packaged as a **Recovery Share Record**:

```
json
{
  "share_id": "share-<agent_id_short>-<index>",
  "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
  "scheme": "shamir-sss-gf256",
  "threshold": 3,
  "total_shares": 5,
  "share_index": 1,
  "share_data": "<base64url-encoded share bytes>",
  "key_fingerprint": "<SHA-3-256 of the public key, hex, first 16 chars>",
  "created_at": "2026-04-03T12:00:00Z",
  "encryption": {
    "algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",
    "note": "Share is encrypted to the custodian's public key before
transmission."
  }
}
```

6. The agent **MUST** encrypt each share to its intended custodian's public key (via ECDH + AES-256-GCM, per §7.3) before transmission. Shares **MUST NOT** be transmitted in plaintext.
7. After successful distribution, the agent **SHOULD** securely delete the assembled set of all shares from local memory.

### 8.3.4 Custodian Model

Shares are distributed to **Recovery Custodians** — trusted entities that store a single share each. Custodians may be:


| Custodian Type              | Description  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| <b>Bonded Peer</b>          | Another OCP agent the agent holds a Level 3+ bond with                                   |
| <b>Organizational Vault</b> | A hardware security module (HSM) or secrets manager operated by the agent's organization |
| <b>Cold Storage</b>         | Offline storage (e.g., printed QR code, air-gapped device) managed by the agent operator |
| <b>Recovery Service</b>     | A third-party OCP extension service ( <code>ocp-ext:recovery:custodian:v1</code> )       |

#### Custodian Rules:

- No single custodian **MAY** hold more than one share for the same agent key.
- The agent **MUST** distribute shares to at least  $t$  independent custodians (custodians not controlled by a single entity).
- Custodians **MUST** store shares encrypted at rest.
- Custodians **MUST** delete shares upon receiving a signed `share_revoke` message from the agent (or upon share expiry).

### 8.3.5 Recovery Procedure

When an agent has lost access to its private key:



#### Steps:

1. The recovering agent (or its operator) contacts at least  $t$  custodians and provides proof of identity. Proof mechanisms include:
  - o Signature from a pre-registered **secondary recovery key** (RECOMMENDED)
  - o Out-of-band verification (e.g., organizational IT approval, in-person verification)
  - o Multi-factor authentication via a registered recovery endpoint
2. Each custodian independently verifies the proof, decrypts their stored share, re-encrypts it to the requester's ephemeral X25519 public key, and returns it.
3. The recovering agent collects  $t$  shares and reconstructs the private key using Lagrange interpolation over  $GF(2^8)$ .
4. The agent verifies reconstruction by deriving the public key and comparing its SHA-3-256 fingerprint to `key_fingerprint`.

- The agent MUST immediately:
  - Generate a new keypair.
  - Publish an updated DID Document with the new key and the old key in the `revocation` list.
  - Send `share_revoke` messages to all custodians for the old shares.
  - Generate and distribute new shares for the new key.

### 8.3.6 Recovery Message Types

Two new message types are added to OCPUMF:

| Type                                 | Description                                  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| <code>recovery_request</code>        | Agent requests share return from a custodian |
| <code>recovery_share_response</code> | Custodian returns an encrypted share         |

#### **recovery\_request** payload:

```
json
{
  "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
  "key_fingerprint": "a3f9b2c1d4e5f6a7",
  "ephemeral_public_key": "<base64url X25519 public key for response encryption>",
  "proof": {
    "type": "secondary_key_signature",
    "secondary_key_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5#recovery-key-1",
    "signature": "<Ed25519 signature over (agent_id || key_fingerprint || ephemeral_public_key)>"
  }
}
```

#### **recovery\_share\_response** payload:

```
json
{
  "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
  "share_index": 1,
  "encrypted_share": "<base64url AES-256-GCM encrypted share, keyed via ECDH to ephemeral key>",
  "nonce": "<base64url 96-bit nonce>"
}
```

### 8.3.7 Secondary Recovery Key

Agents SHOULD register a **secondary recovery key** in their DID Document specifically for recovery authentication:

```
json
{
  "id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5#recovery-key-1",
  "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2020",
  "controller": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
  "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkrecovery...",
  "purpose": "recovery"
}
```

This key SHOULD be stored separately from the primary signing key (e.g., cold storage, HSM, or with a trusted operator).

### 8.3.8 Share Expiry and Rotation

- Shares SHOULD have an expiry aligned with the agent's key rotation schedule (default: 90 days).
- When an agent rotates its primary key, it MUST revoke old shares and distribute new shares for the new key.
- Custodians MUST delete expired shares.

### 8.3.9 Security Properties

| Property           | Guarantee   |
|--------------------|---|
| Threshold security | t-1 compromised custodians learn nothing about the private key                  |
| No master key      | No single entity (including the OCP Foundation) can reconstruct any agent's key |
| Forward secrecy    | Recovery uses ephemeral keys; share transmission is not replayable              |
| Auditability       | All recovery requests are standard OCP messages with signatures and timestamps  |
| Revocability       | Shares can be revoked at any time; key rotation invalidates old shares          |

## 8.3 Post-Quantum Readiness

This specification reserves the following algorithm identifiers for future post-quantum extensions:

| Identifier      | Algorithm          | Status   |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------|
| PQ-ML-KEM-768   | ML-KEM (FIPS 203)  | Reserved |
| PQ-ML-DSA-65    | ML-DSA (FIPS 204)  | Reserved |
| PQ-SLH-DSA-128s | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) | Reserved |

Implementations SHOULD prepare for hybrid key exchange (X25519 + ML-KEM) as defined in a future OCP-PQ extension.

## 9. Rate Limiting & Quotas

Implementations MUST enforce rate limits to prevent abuse:

| Scope                        | Default Limit | Window       |
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Messages per agent           | 1000          | 60 seconds   |
| Bond requests per agent      | 10            | 3600 seconds |
| Discovery queries per agent  | 100           | 60 seconds   |
| Broadcast messages per agent | 5             | 60 seconds   |
| Knowledge payloads per agent | 50            | 60 seconds   |
| Max payload size             | 10 MB         | per message  |
| Max message size (total)     | 16 MB         | per message  |

Rate-limited requests MUST receive an OCP-429 error with a `Retry-After` header (in seconds).

## 10. Extension Mechanism

### 10.1 Extension Namespaces

Domain-specific extensions are registered under the `ocp-ext` namespace:

```
ocp-ext:<domain>:<extension-name>:v<version>
```

Examples: `ocp-ext:healthcare:dicom-share:v1`, `ocp-ext:finance:risk-signal:v1`

### 10.2 Extension Registration

Extensions MUST be registered in the OCP Extension Registry with:

- Extension identifier
- JSON Schema for extended payload fields
- Minimum OCP version required
- Maintainer DID
- Specification document URL

### 10.3 Extension Discovery

Agents advertise supported extensions in their Agent Record:

```
json
{
  "extensions": [
    {
      "id": "ocp-ext:healthcare:dicom-share:v1",
      "config": { ... }
    }
  ]
}
```

## 11. Conformance

### 11.1 Conformance Levels


| Level                | Name               | Requirements   |
|----------------------|--------------------|--|
| <b>OCP Core</b>      | Minimum viable     | Layers 1–2 fully implemented, OCPUMF compliant, passes core test suite |
| <b>OCP Knowledge</b> | Knowledge exchange | OCP Core + Layer 3 fully implemented, PVL enforced                     |
| <b>OCP Full</b>      | Complete protocol  | All 5 layers implemented, passes full compliance suite                 |

### 11.2 Compliance Testing

A conforming implementation **MUST** pass the OCP Compliance Test Suite, which validates:

- DID generation and resolution
- Message serialization, signing, and encryption
- Transport connectivity (at least one supported transport)
- Registry registration and discovery
- Trust level enforcement
- PVL enforcement (for OCP Knowledge and above)
- Task lifecycle (for OCP Full)
- Consensus protocol (for OCP Full)

## Appendix A: OCP Domain Taxonomy (v1.0)



Domains are hierarchical. An agent registered under `healthcare.oncology` is implicitly discoverable under `healthcare`.

## Appendix B: Capability Identifier Format

```
cap:<domain>:<capability_name>
```

Examples:

- cap:nlp:classification
- cap:nlp:summarization
- cap:nlp:translation
- cap:nlp:report\_gen
- cap:vision:imaging
- cap:vision:object\_detection
- cap:finance:risk\_analysis
- cap:finance:portfolio\_optimization
- cap:data:clustering
- cap:data:regression
- cap:code:generation
- cap:code:review

Custom capabilities MUST use the format `cap:custom:<org>:<name>`.

## Appendix C: Wire Examples

### C.1 Discovery Ping

```
json
{
  "ocp_version": "1.0",
  "message_id": "msg-a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd",
  "timestamp": "2026-04-03T12:00:00Z",
  "ttl": 60,
  "sender": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
    "signature": "..."
  },
  "receiver": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:broadcast",
    "broadcast": true
  },
}
```

```
"message_type": "discovery_ping",
"priority": "low",
"payload": {
  "capabilities": ["cap:nlp:classification", "cap:vision:imaging"],
  "domains": ["healthcare", "oncology"],
  "trust_level": 2
},
"metadata": {
  "tags": ["healthcare"],
  "requires_ack": false
}
}
```

## C.2 Knowledge Share with Encryption

```
{
  "ocp_version": "1.0",
  "message_id": "msg-f7e6d5c4-b3a2-1098-7654",
  "timestamp": "2026-04-03T12:05:00Z",
  "ttl": 3600,
  "sender": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
    "signature": "..."
  },
  "receiver": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789def01",
    "broadcast": false
  },
  "message_type": "knowledge_share",
  "priority": "normal",
  "encryption": {
    "algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",
    "key_exchange": "ECDH-X25519",
    "nonce": "base64url-encoded-96bit-nonce",
    "ephemeral_public_key": "base64url-encoded-x25519-public-key"
  },
  "payload": "<base64url-encoded-encrypted-knowledge-payload>",
  "metadata": {
    "tags": ["oncology", "imaging"],
    "language": "en",
    "requires_ack": true,
    "correlation_id": "session-2026-04-03-001"
  }
}
```

### C.3 Bond Request → Accept Flow

#### Request:

```
json
{
  "ocp_version": "1.0",
  "message_id": "msg-11112222-3333-4444-5555",
  "timestamp": "2026-04-03T13:00:00Z",
  "ttl": 86400,
  "sender": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
    "signature": "..."
  },
  "receiver": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789def01",
    "broadcast": false
  },
  "message_type": "bond_request",
  "priority": "normal",
  "payload": {
    "proposed_permissions": {
      "knowledge_share": { "enabled": true, "allowed_types": ["insight",
"embedding"] },
      "task_delegate": { "enabled": true, "max_concurrent": 3 },
      "model_delta_share": { "enabled": false }
    },
    "proposed_duration_days": 180
  },
  "metadata": {
    "requires_ack": true
  }
}
```

#### Accept:

```
json
{
  "ocp_version": "1.0",
  "message_id": "msg-66667777-8888-9999-aaaa",
  "timestamp": "2026-04-03T13:05:00Z",
  "ttl": 86400,
  "sender": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-xyz789def01",
    "signature": "..."
  },
  "receiver": {
    "agent_id": "did:ocp:mainnet:agent-a3f9b2c1d4e5",
    "broadcast": false
  },
}
```

```

"message_type": "bond_accept",
"priority": "normal",
"payload": {
  "bond_id": "bond-aabbccdd-eeff-0011-2233",
  "agreed_permissions": {
    "knowledge_share": { "enabled": true, "allowed_types": ["insight",
"embedding"], "max_payload_bytes": 10485760 },
    "task_delegate": { "enabled": true, "max_concurrent": 3,
"timeout_seconds": 300 },
    "model_delta_share": { "enabled": false }
  },
  "expires_at": "2026-10-03T13:05:00Z",
  "signature": "..."
},
"metadata": {
  "correlation_id": "msg-11112222-3333-4444-5555",
  "requires_ack": true
}
}

```

## Appendix D: Reference Constants

| Constant                    | Value   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE            | 16,777,216 bytes (16 MB)                            |
| MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE            | 10,485,760 bytes (10 MB)                            |
| DEFAULT_TTL                 | 3600 seconds  |
| MAX_TTL                     | 86,400 seconds (24 hours)                           |
| AUTH_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT      | 5 seconds   |
| ACK_TIMEOUT                 | 30 seconds  |
| TASK_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT        | 300 seconds   |
| MAX_RETRY_COUNT             | 5   |
| RETRY_BASE_DELAY            | 1 second (exponential backoff: 1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s) |
| REGISTRY_RECORD_DEFAULT_TTL | 86,400 seconds                                      |
| MAX_VOUCH_DURATION          | 31,536,000 seconds (365 days)                       |
| MAX_BOND_DURATION           | 31,536,000 seconds (365 days)                       |
| KEY_ROTATION_RECOMMENDED    | 7,776,000 seconds (90 days)                         |
| TRUST_SCORE_RANGE           | [0.0, 1.0]  |
| MAX_EPSILON                 | 10.0  |



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
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- b) Facilitate market manipulation, coordinated trading, or any activity that violates applicable securities law or market abuse regulation;
- c) Share knowledge signals derived from clinical trial data, patient health records, or genomic data in violation of applicable research ethics requirements, including IRB protocols and patient consent obligations;
- d) Enable cross-company coordination that constitutes anticompetitive behaviour under applicable competition law, including price-fixing, market allocation, or bid-rigging;
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